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Abstract: This paper makes a pioneering attempt to provide a theory of determination of 
interest rate in the informal credit market in a small open economy in terms of a three-
sector general equilibrium model. There are two informal sectors which obtain 
production loans from a monopolistic moneylender and employ labour from the informal 
labour market. On the other hand, the formal sector employs labour at an institutionally 
fixed wage rate and takes loans from the competitive formal credit market. We show that 
an inflow of foreign capital and/or an emigration of labour raises (lowers) the informal 
(formal) interest rate while lowers the competitive wage rate in the informal labour 
market when the informal manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the 
agricultural informal sector. International factor mobility, therefore, increases the degrees 
of distortions in both the factor markets in this case.  
 
Keywords: Informal credit, formal credit, moneylender, foreign capital, emigration, 
general equilibrium. 
JEL classification: D42; F21, F22; O17.  
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International Factor Mobility, Informal Interest Rate and Capital Market 
Imperfection: A General Equilibrium Analysis 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
There exists a financial dualism in the less developed countries (LDCs) like India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh with two different credit markets – formal and informal. The 
formal capital market is competitive and supplies capital to the organized production 
sectors of the economy at relatively low rates of interest. On the contrary, the informal 
credit market is characterized by high degrees of imperfection and makes itself the major 
source of credit to the unorganized production sectors like agriculture, urban informal 
sectors etc. Professional moneylenders, having local monopolistic power, charge 
exorbitantly high rates of interest1 to their borrowers.  
 
The theoretical literature dealing with the interaction between the formal credit market 
and informal credit market consists of two types of models. Contributions like Chaudhuri 
and Gupta (1996), Gupta and Chaudhuri (1997), and Chaudhuri (1998, 2001, 2004) 
analyze interaction between the two credit markets in the presence of corruption in the 
loan delivery system in the formal credit market. On the other hand, works like Bose 
(1998), Hoff and Stiglitz (1996), Floro and Roy (1997), Jain (1999), Chaudhuri and 
Ghosh Dastidar (2011) etc. consider vertical linkages between the two credit markets 
where informal sector lenders act as financial intermediaries between the formal credit 
agency and the final borrowers of credit. 
 
However, models belonging to this area are built in partial equilibrium framework and 
deal with a pure agrarian economy. A complete model developed in a general equilibrium 
framework incorporating the interaction between these two credit markets as well as the 
interdependence between the urban development and the rural development is found in 
Gupta (1997) which provides a framework to analyze the effect of various urban 
                                                 
1
 The informal interest rate could be as high as 40 per cent or even 120 per cent per annum. See 
Basu (1998) and Bedbak (1986) in this context. 
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development policies on the relative development of the two credit markets.2 However, 
the model of Gupta (1997) assumes informal capital to be mobile between the urban 
informal sector and the rural sector and keeps formal capital to remain specific to the 
urban formal sector. Furthermore, the two capital markets in this model are completely 
disintegrated and there is no scope for formal credit to flow into the informal credit 
market. Also quite unrealistically, the informal credit market is assumed to be 
competitive in that model when there are several theoretical and empirical works 
emphasizing the imperfection in this credit market.3 Also the literature does not comprise 
of any general equilibrium models that provide a theory of determination of the informal 
interest rate starting from the behaviour of the informal sector lender. This justifies the 
need for further research in this area introducing imperfection in the informal credit 
market as well as integration between these two credit markets.  
 
The present paper develops a static general equilibrium model of a small open economy 
consisting of three sectors - a formal, an informal and a rural (agricultural). The informal 
sector produces a non-traded intermediate good for the formal sector while the other two 
sectors produce two internationally traded final commodities. The formal capital market 
that supplies capital to the formal sector is assumed to be competitive like Gupta (1997). 
However, we introduce imperfection in the informal credit market that supplies capital to 
the informal and rural sector producers. Also the two credit markets are not disintegrated 
and capital can flow from one market to the other. Any inflow of foreign capital 
necessarily goes to the urban formal sector in Gupta (1997)4 while in the present model it 
may flow into both credit markets. 
 
                                                 
2
 This treatment of dichotomy between the formal-informal credit markets is also available in 
Chaudhuri (2003) which studies the welfare consequences of different liberalized economic 
policies in a small open economy setting.  
 
3
 See for examples, Bhaduri (1977), Bardhan (1984), Bardhan and Rudra (1978), Sarap (1991), 
Bottomley (1975), Basu (1984, 1998), Basu and Bell (1991), Bell (1988) and Chaudhuri (2004). 
 
4
 Chaudhuri (2003) model also shares the same limitation. 
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The present analysis derives some interesting results that are new in the literature on 
agricultural credit. An inflow of foreign capital, given the endowment of labour, 
unambiguously raises the price of the informal sector’s product and the informal interest 
rate but lowers the formal interest rate and the wage rate in the informal labour market. 
Similar results are obtained when an emigration of labour takes place given the capital 
endowment of the economy. So either the foreign capital inflow or the emigration of 
labour aggravates the extent of formal-informal wage gap as well as the interest rate gap 
between the two credit markets. So degrees of distortions in both the factor markets are 
increased following inflows of foreign capital and/or emigration of labour.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section 2. Subsection 2.1 
analyzes the behaviour of the monopolistic lender who is the only source of capital in the 
informal credit market. Subsection 2.2 describes the equational structure of the general 
equilibrium model. Section 3 presents the comparative static effects with respect to 
changes in capital and labour endowments. Finally, concluding remarks are made in 
section 4.  
 
2. The Model 
 
We consider a small open developing economy with three sectors: one formal and two 
informal. One of the two informal sectors (sector 1) produces an agricultural commodity 
( 1X ) using labour ( L ) and capital ( K ) while the other informal sector (sector 2) 
produces a non-traded intermediate good ( 2X ) for the formal sector with the help of 
same two inputs. The formal sector produces a manufacturing commodity ( 3X ) by means 
of labour, capital and the non-traded intermediate input. Markets other than the formal 
sector labour market and the informal sector credit market are perfectly competitive. The 
representative firm in each of these three sectors maximizes profit. Factor endowments                               
are given exogenously. Labour and capital move freely across different sectors. There are 
imperfections in the market for labour in the formal sector. Workers in sector 3 are 
unionized and they receive a high fixed wage, *W , while their counterparts in the two 
 5 
informal sectors earn only a flexible competitive wage,W with *W W> .5 Workers first 
try to get employment in the formal sector as it offers a high wage. Those who are not 
successful in getting jobs in the formal sector are automatically absorbed in the two 
informal sector owing to complete flexibility of the informal wage,W . The two informal 
sectors do not have any access to the formal capital market where the return to capital is 
r and hence are compelled to fall back upon the informal credit market, monopolized by 
a moneylender where and the interest rate is denoted by R .  The per-unit requirement of 
the intermediate input in sector 3 is assumed to be technologically fixed.6,7 Sector 1 and 
sector 2 together form a Heckscher-Ohlin sub-system (HOSS). Sector 2 uses capital more 
intensively vis-à-vis sector 1. However, sector 3 is the most capital-intensive sector in the 
economy. Production functions in all the three sectors exhibit constant returns to scale8 
with positive and diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. Owing to our small 
open economy assumption, prices of both the final commodities ( 1P and 3P ) are given 
internationally. However, as sector 2 produces a non-traded intermediate good its 
                                                 
5
 Firms in the formal sector face unionized labour market. One of the most important roles of the 
labour unions is to bargain with their respective employers in respect of the betterment of the 
working conditions.  Through offer of negotiation, threat of strike, actual strike etc. the trade 
unions exert pressure on the employers (firms) in order to secure higher wages, reduced hours of 
work, share in profits and other benefits. Organized workers in large firms leave no stones 
unturned so as to reap wages higher than their reservation wage i.e. the informal sector wage. See 
Bhalotra (2002) and Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009) in this context.  
 
6
 It rules out the possibility of substitution between the non-traded intermediate good and other 
factors of production in sector 3. Although this is a simplifying assumption, it is not totally 
unrealistic. In industries like shoe making and garments, large formal sector firms farm out their 
production to the small informal sector firms under the system of subcontracting. So the 
production is done in the informal sector firms while labeling, packaging and marketing are done 
by the formal sector firms. One pair of shoes produced in the informal sector does not change in 
quantity when it is marketed by the formal sector as a final commodity. Thus there remains a 
fixed proportion between the use of the intermediate good and the quantity of the final 
commodity produced and marketed by the formal sector. See Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay 
(2009) in this context.   
 
7
 Even though the non-traded input-output ratio ( 23a ) in sector 3 is technologically given, labour 
and capital are substitutes and the production function displays the constant returns to scale 
property in these two inputs. 
 
8
 See footnotes 6 and 7 in this context.  
 6 
price, 2P , is determined domestically. Finally, we assume that labour and capital are 
substitutes to each other in all the sectors. This means that any cross partials of the factor 
coefficients are positive.  
 
2.1 The moneylender’s behaviour  
 
The moneylender, denoted by M , is the only source of informal credit. So he enjoys 
monopoly power in the informal credit market. He borrows funds from the formal credit 
market at the interest rate, r , and lends it to the informal sector producers at the interest 
rate, R . The aggregate demand for informal credit of the moneylender, B , is given by                                                                        
1 1 2 2( , ) ( , )K KB a W R X a W R X= +        (1) 
where Kia and iX are the capital-output ratio and output level in the i th sector for. 1,2i =  
W and R stand for the informal wage rate and the informal interest rate, respectively.   
 
The moneylender’s net interest income is given by 
1 1 2 2( ) ( )[ ( , ) ( , ) ]M K KY R r B R r a W R X a W R X= − = − +     (2) 
 
The monopolist moneylender maximizes his net interest income through a choice of R . 
The first-order condition of maximization is given by 
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2[(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] 0K KL KL K KL KL
r r
a X S S a X S S
R R
− + + − + =     (3) 
Here kjiS is the degree of substitution between factor j and factor i in the k th sector, where 
, ,j i K L= ; and, k = 1,2,3. 0>kjiS for ij ≠ ; and, 0kjjS < .  
 
From equation (3) we have  
1 2
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1 2 2
(1 ) (1 ) 2[ ] ( ) 0(1 ) (1 )
K KL K KL
K KL K KL
a X S a X S R r
a X S a X S r
+ + + −
= − <
− + −
     (3.1) 
 
So from equation (3.1) it follows that either 
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1 2
1 1 2 2(1 ) (1 ) 0K KL K KLa X S a X S− + − < ;    
or,             (3.2) 
11 KLS≤  and
21 KLS≤   
with at least one being a strict inequality.                                   
 
2.2  The general equilibrium analysis 
 
The price sub-system of this general equilibrium model is represented by the following set of 
equations: 
1 1 1L KWa Ra P+ =          (4) 
2 2 2L KWa Ra P+ =          (5) 
and, 
3 2 2 23 3* L KW a ra P a P+ + =         (6) 
where iP stands for price of the i th good for 1,2,3i = ; and, 23a stands for the per unit 
requirement of the intermediate good in sector 3. Each of these three equations represents 
the competitive equilibrium condition in the corresponding product market. 
 
The quantity sub-system of the general equilibrium model is described by the following 
equations. 
1 1 2 2 3 3L L La X a X a X L+ + =         (7) 
1 1 2 2 3 3K K K D Fa X a X a X K K K+ + = + =       (8) 
and, 
23 3 2a X X=           (9) 
 
Equations (7) and (8) are full-employment conditions for labour and capital. Equation (9) 
represents the demand-supply equality condition in the non-traded intermediate good 
market. The capital stock of the economy consists of both domestic capital ( DK ) and 
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foreign capital ( FK ) which are perfect substitutes.9 Equation (3) is the first-order 
condition of maximization of the net interest income of the moneylender.  
 
The general equilibrium set-up consists of seven endogenous 
variables, 2 1 2, , , , ,W R r P X X and 3X , and exactly the same number of independent 
equations, namely equation (3) and equations (4) – (9). The solution mechanism is the 
following. W and R are determined from equations (4) and (5) as functions of 2P . Then 
1 2, ,r X X and 3X are determined from equations (3), (6), (7) and (8) simultaneously as 
functions of 2P . Finally, 2P  is solved from equation (9). 
 
3. Comparative statics  
 
Here we examine the effects of an inflow of foreign capital and/or an emigration of 
labour on factor prices. The conventional wisdom as obtained from competitive 
equilibrium analysis suggests that an inflow of foreign capital must lead to an expansion 
of the formal sector and draw labour from the informal sectors resulting in an increase in 
the informal sector wage rate. The formal and informal interest rates should go down as 
the supply of capital rises given its demand. On the other hand, an emigration of labour 
lowers the availability of labour in the source country and should raise the informal sector 
wage. The labour-intensive informal sectors are expected to contract for scarcity of 
labour and release capital to the formal sector leading to an expansion of the latter. The 
interest rate in the informal sector should go down while the formal interest rate should 
go up. We are going to show that these results are not so straightforward in this model for 
two reasons: (i) there is monopoly in the informal credit market; and, (ii) there is a non-
traded good (produced by sector 2) in the picture and there is a complementary 
relationship between the formal sector (sector 3) and the non-traded sector. 
 
                                                 
9
 It may be mentioned that this assumption has been widely used in the theoretical literature on 
trade and development. 
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Differentiating both sides of equations (4) and (5) and solving them we find 
1
2
ˆ ˆ( )KW Pθ
θ
= −           (10) 
and, 
1
2
ˆ ˆ( )LR Pθ
θ
=           (11) 
Here jiθ is the distributive share of the j th factor in the i th sector. We assume that 
1 2 2 1( ) 0L K L Kθ θ θ θ θ= − > . This implies that the non-traded intermediate good-producing 
informal sector (sector 2) is more capital-intensive than the traded good-producing 
informal sector (sector 1) in both physical and value sense. 
 
Differentiating both sides of equations (3), (6), (7) and (8), simplifying and arranging 
them in a matrix notation, we have 
23 23
2 1 1 1 3 2
3
L3 L1 L2 L3 2 4 2
3
K3 K1 K2 K3 3 5 2
ˆˆ
        0      0       0
ˆ ˆA         A   -A      0
ˆ ˆ ˆS          ( )
ˆS        ˆ ˆ( )
K
LK
KL
r P
X A P
X L A P
X K A P
θθ
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
   − 
   
   
=    
−   
  
−   +   
;     (12) 
where: 1 1 2 21 1 1 2 2[(1 ) ] [(1 ) ]K KL KL K KL KL
r rA a X S S a X S S
R R
= − + = − − + ; 
1 2
2 1 1 2 2( )( ) 0KL K KL K
rA S a X S a X
R
= + > ; 
2 2
1 2 1 2
3 1 1 1 2 2 1 2
1( )[ { ( ) ( )}K KK K KL K KL
a aA a X S a X S R r W X X
R W R W
θ
θ
∂ ∂
= + + − +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
  (13) 
                
2 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 2 1 22 2{2( ) ( ) ( )}] 0K KL K KL K KL
a a
a X S a X S R r R X X
R R
θ ∂ ∂+ + − − + >
∂ ∂
; 
1 2
1 2
4 ( ) 0L LK L LK
S SA λ λ
θ
+
= > ; 
1 2
1 2
5 ( ) 0K KL K KL
S SA λ λ
θ
+
= > ; 
and, jiλ is the allocative share of the j th factor in the i th sector. 
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Solving the set of equations (12) by Cramer’s rule we obtain the following expressions. 
23
2
3
ˆ
ˆ ( )
K
r Pθ
θ
= − ;          (14) 
3 32
1 3 3 23 2 2 3 3 2 1 23 3 3
ˆ
ˆ ( )[( )( ) { ( )K L K L K L K LK KL
PX A A A S Sθ θ λ λ λ λ θ λ λ= + − + +
∆
 
                 
3 1 3 3 1 3
3 3 4 3 5
ˆ ˆ( )}] ( ) ( )K L K KK K L
A AA A K Lθ λ θ λθ λ λ− + − +
∆ ∆
;   (15) 
2
2 3 1 4 3 5 3 3 3 1 3 3 1
ˆ
ˆ ( )[ ( ) ( )K K L K L K L K
PX A A A Aθ λ λ θ λ λ λ λ= − + + −
∆
 
                                     
3 3
23 2 1 3 3 1 1 3 3{ ( ) ( )}]L K L K L K LK KLA A S Sθ λ λ λ λ λ λ+ − − +   (16) 
                              
3 3 1 3 3 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( )K K K LA AL Kθ λ θ λ+ −
∆ ∆
; 
and, 
2
3 3 5 1 2 4 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 1
ˆ
ˆ ( )[ { ( ) ( )} ( )K L L K K K L K L K
PX A A Aθ λ λ λ λ θ λ λ λ λ= + + + + −
∆
 
                        
3 3
23 2 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 2 1 3 1 2{ ( ) ( ) ( ) }]L K L K L K K LK K L L KLA A S A Sθ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ+ − − + − +  
                                  
3 1 3 1
1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ( )( ) ( )( )K KL L K K
A AK Lθ θλ λ λ λ+ + − +
∆ ∆
   (17) 
Here ∆ is the determinant of the above coefficient matrix. It is given by 
3 1 2 3 3 2 1 3 3 1[( ) ( )]
                            (+)                        (+)
K L K L K L K L KAθ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ∆ = − + −
     (18) 
Note that sector 3 is more capital-intensive relative to both sector 1 and sector 2 in 
physical sense as well as in value sense. 
 
As sector 2 produces a non-traded intermediate good its market must clear domestically. 
For the equilibrium in the intermediate good market to be Walrasian stable it requires that 
3 2
2 2
ˆ ˆ
( ) ( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
X XD
P P
= − <                                    
Using equations (16) and (17) and simplifying the stability condition we have  
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3 1 4 5 3 3 23 2 1 2 3 1 2 3
1( )[ ( ) ( ){ ( ) ( )}K K L K K K L LD A A A A Aθ θ θ λ λ λ λ λ λ= + + + + − +∆  
                                                        
3 3
23 1 3 3( )] 0L LK K KLA S Sθ λ λ− + <    (19) 
 
In equilibrium the demand for the non-traded intermediate good must equal its supply. 
Totally differentiating both sides of equation (9) one obtains 
3 2
ˆ ˆX X= .          (20) 
 
From equation (20) use of equations (16) and (17) and simplification yield 
3 1
2
ˆ ˆ( )K AP K
D
θ
= −
∆
 when ˆ 0L = ;        (21) 
and,        
3 1
2
ˆ ˆ( )K AP L
D
θ
=
∆
 when ˆ 0K =         (22) 
 
Substituting the expression for ∆ from equation (18) in equations (21) and (22), we find 
the following expressions. 
2
2 3 3 2 1 3 3 1
ˆ 1( ) [ ] 0
ˆ [( ) ( )]
               (-)            (+)                        (+)
L K L K L K L K
P
DK λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
= − >
− + − ;    (23) 
and, 
2
2 3 3 2 1 3 3 1
ˆ 1( ) [ ] 0
ˆ [( ) ( )]
            (-)            (+)                        (+)
L K L K L K L K
P
DL λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
= <
− + −     (24) 
Equations (23) and (24) help us to establish the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: An increase in the capital endowment, given the labour endowment, 
unambiguously raises the price of the non-traded intermediate good. An increase in the 
labour endowment of the economy, given the capital endowment lowers it.  
 
Here an inflow of foreign capital leads to an expansion of the capital stock while an 
emigration of labour from the source country lowers its labour endowment. The intuitive 
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explanations of proposition 1 are fairly straightforward. The production structure here is 
an indecomposable one. Therefore factor prices depend on both commodity prices and 
factor endowments.  Sector 1 and sector 2 together form a Heckscher-Ohlin subsystem 
(HOSS) as they use the same two inputs. Besides, there is a perfect complementarity 
between sector 2 and sector 3 as the latter uses the output of the former as an input in a 
fixed proportion. A mere inspection of equations (15) – (17) reveals that any changes in 
factor endowments affect the output composition through a Rybczynski effect and 
through a change in the price of the non-traded input, 2P . The latter produces a Stolper-
Samuelson effect and a subsequent Rybczynski type effect in the HOSS which in turn 
produces an indirect impact on the output composition of the different sectors. An 
increase in capital endowment leads to an expansion of the most capital-intensive sector 
(sector 3) and contraction of both the informal sectors. In equations (15) – (17), these 
changes are captured by the terms containing ˆK . As sector 3 expands, the demand for the 
non-traded intermediate good produced by sector 2 rises while its supply falls. This 
unambiguously raises the price of the non-traded good, 2P . On the contrary, if the labour 
endowment rises (falls) sector 3, being the least labour-intensive sector, contracts 
(expands) while the two informal sectors expand (contract). The demand for the non-
traded input goes down (up) while its supply goes up (down). Consequently, 2P falls 
(rises) unequivocally.   
 
Using equations (10), (11) (14), (23) and (24) we obtain effects of changes in K and L  on 
factor prices. These effects are described as follows.  
1 2
ˆˆ
( ) ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
               (+)   (+) 
K PW
K K
θ
θ
= − <
 ;        (25) 
1 2
ˆˆ
( ) ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
            (+)   (+)
L PR
K K
θ
θ
= >
;         (26) 
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23 2
3
ˆ
ˆ( ) ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
                       (+)
K
Pr
K K
θ
θ
= − <
;        (27) 
1 2
ˆˆ
( ) ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
               (+)   (-) 
K PW
L L
θ
θ
= − >
 ;        (28) 
1 2
ˆˆ
( ) ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
            (+)   (-)
L PR
L L
θ
θ
= <
;         (29) 
and, 
23 2
3
ˆ
ˆ( ) ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
                      (-)
K
Pr
L L
θ
θ
= − >
         (30) 
 
All these results can be summarized in terms of the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: An increase ( a decrease) in the endowment of capital (labour) given the 
endowment of the other factor, leads to (i) an increase in the informal interest rate; (ii) a 
decrease in the formal interest rate; and, (ii) a fall in the informal wage rate. 
 
Proposition 2 can be intuitively explained as follows. While explaining proposition 1 we 
have already shown how an increase in the capital endowment raises the price of the non-
traded input, 2P . This produces a Stolper-Samuelson effect in the HOSS raising the 
informal interest rate ( R ) and lowering the informal sector wage (W ) as the 
manufacturing informal sector (sector 2) is assumed to be more capital-intensive than the 
agricultural informal sector (sector 1). The formal interest rate, r , must fall so as to 
satisfy the zero-profit condition in sector 3.10 The increase in capital endowment, given 
its demand, exerts a downward pressure on the formal interest rate in this sector. The 
effects of a change in the labour endowment on factor prices can easily be explained 
following the reverse mechanism. 
                                                 
10
 See equation (6). 
 14 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have developed a three-sector static general equilibrium model of a small 
open economy with distortions in both the labour market and the capital market. The 
informal capital market is different from the formal capital market in the sense that the 
latter being competitive in nature supplies capital to the formal sector firms while the 
former being monopolistic in nature provides funds to the informal and rural sector 
producers. We, however, do not consider the Harris-Todaro (1970) type rural-urban 
migration and unemployment of labour. 
 
We obtain a few interesting results. If the informal sector producing a non-traded 
intermediate good for the formal sector is more capital-intensive than the rural informal 
sector, an increase in the capital stock and/or a decrease in labour endowment would 
lower the wage rate in the informal labour market as well as the interest rate in the formal 
credit market but raises the interest rate in the informal capital market. Thus degrees of 
distortion in both the factor market aggravate in this case. This result is different from 
that we obtain in Gupta (1997) model where an increase in the capital stock and/or a 
decrease in labour endowment raises the informal wage rate and lowers the interest rate 
in the informal credit market when there is Harris-Todaro (1970) type induced migration 
and the labour sending rural sector is more capital-intensive than the labour receiving 
urban informal sector. No unambiguous results on factor prices in the informal sector can 
be obtained in Gupta (1997) when the urban informal sector is more capital-intensive 
than the rural sector. Moreover, there is a major difference in the mechanism of working 
between the two models. In Gupta (1997), changes in factor endowments affect factor 
prices through the Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium condition, but in the present 
model, corresponding effects are generated through movement in the price of the non-
traded good.   
 
Finally, there are some restrictive assumptions embodied in the present analysis. There is 
no induced migration and unemployment which are two salient features of an LDC. Also 
the labour input is homogeneous and there is no distinction between workers with respect 
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to their skills. Also some of the essential characteristics of the informal credit market like 
interlinkages with other markets are missing. Besides, the informal credit market is 
fragmented oligopolistic in nature and there is a segment in the credit market where 
informal lenders compete with each other11. Future research in this area should address 
these issues.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 See Basu and Bell (1991), Mishra (1994) and Basu (1997) in this context.  
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